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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN 
AGE: REJECTING DOCTRINAL  
NIHILISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF 
RELIGIOUS CLAIMS 
 
LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In his book, Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age,2 Nelson 
Tebbe takes on one of the most intractable problems in 
contemporary American culture: the conflict between claimed 
religious commands and secular norms that establish human 
rights.3 
Of course, there would not necessarily have to be a conflict 
between these forces.4 Religious rights of freedom of belief and 
expression could be experienced in individually private settings, 
or in institutional settings comprised of like-minded believers 
such as religious schools, synagogues, churches, and mosques.5  
However, even in those settings conflicts arise.6 Religious schools 
can admit or employ individuals who later object to evolving 
religious doctrines and practices, and who claim the protection of 
secular laws.7  Synagogues, churches, and mosques can 
experience similar conflicts with congregants or employees.  In 
American law, ideas of religious-group autonomy proposed 
solutions for such conflicts, but they establish – at best – jagged 
and uncertain lines of religious institutional exemption from 
secular law.8 
In addition, and of most pressing current importance, religious 
individuals can assert refusals to comply with secular human-
rights laws.9 Religious individuals do not confine themselves to 
some kind of separate religious sphere; they are usually active 
and involved in all aspects of community life.  They run 
 
1   J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell University. 
2  NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE (2017). 
3 Conflicts between religious demands and secular norms is also a problem of 
international dimensions.  As the editors of a recent volume exploring 
religion/government conflicts write, “in many countries around the world, religion . . . is 
perceived as one of the most significant threats to the liberal identity of countries and 
individuals.  Beyond the negative sentiment and the pragmatic threat that liberals at 
times experience toward different religions, parts of the liberal intellectual tradition . . .  
seem[] to consider religion as a threat to the liberal world and its dedication to human 
rights.” See Hanoch Dagan, Shahar Lifshitz, and Yedidia Z. Stern, RELIGION AND THE 
DISCOURSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 11 (2014).  
4    Id.  
5 For a discussion of the legal confusion in this area, see Laura S. Underkuffler, Thoughts 
on Smith and Religious Group Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1773, 1776 (2004). 
6  Id.  
7   Id. at 1784–85. 
8   Id. at 1773. 
9   TEBBE, supra note 2, at 1, 5. 
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businesses, they offer services, and they work in government 
offices.  It is the question of the enforcement of government civil-
rights laws in those settings that is the primary focus of Tebbe’s 
study.  For instance, how should we resolve public-
accommodation and service cases, such as the refusal – on 
religious grounds – of a photographer to render services for a gay 
wedding ceremony, or the refusal of a company psychiatrist to 
counsel same-sex couples?  Should we permit a religious 
employer, who employs members of the general public, to refuse 
to hire women who “co-habit” with men, or to terminate 
employees who publish sentiments on Facebook that contravene 
church teaching?  Can a religious employer refuse to supply 
certain employee health coverage, which is required by federal 
law, on the ground that it might lead to actions by employees 
that are repugnant to the employer’s religious beliefs?  
In this thoughtful, groundbreaking, and meticulously balanced 
book, Tebbe suggests new ways to look at these conflicts.10  
Although he discusses the relative merits of particular conflicting 
claims, the truly innovative – and, I would predict, the most 
lasting – accomplishment of the book is to fundamentally 
challenge the way in which these conflicts are approached.   
The difficulties involved in religious/equality cases has, over 
time, led to an attitude that these cases are beyond ordinary 
judicial processes.  When we think of conflicts between religion 
and secular norms of equality, we tend – in Tebbe’s words – to 
assume an area of law that is “inherently or necessarily 
patternless.”11  We tend to think of these conflicts as boiling down 
to a personal view as to which is more intrinsically important – 
religion or equality.  Although there is talk about “judicial 
evaluation” and “judicial processes,” the reality is that any kind 
of real analysis of the claims, under any kind of agreed-upon 
principles, is impossible.12  We see each conflict as a kind of new 
ad hoc battle, with resolution depending (as a practical matter) 
only upon the identity and personal beliefs of the one who 
decides. 
 
10 See generally TEBBE, supra note 2. 
11 Id. at 5 (emphasis in orginal).  
12 Id.  
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Tebbe does not deny the practical power of this kind of 
doctrinal skepticism (or what I would call doctrinal “nihilism”) in 
disputes between religion and secular norms.13  Indeed, the 
unabashed passions of the participants in these cases seem to 
compel this conclusion, as a personal matter at least.  However, 
in his book Tebbe separates the personal convictions of 
participants from the required analysis of courts.14 Although the 
use of neutral principles in the reconciliation of personal 
convictions in such cases might be impossible, in the courts – he 
claims – it is not. 
Tebbe’s argument proceeds along two separate tracks.  First, 
he rejects the arguments of academic skeptics and others that 
these conflicts are by nature something that is not amenable to 
the judicial task.15  Rather, he argues, conflicts between religious 
freedom and civil rights can be worked through by courts, using 
what he calls a “social coherence” approach.16 This does not, of 
itself, “pretend to determine unique answers to pressing 
substantive questions”;17 but it establishes a way to generate 
reasoned conclusions that are intrinsically superior to the ad 
hockery or nihilistic approach that skeptics assume.   
Next, Tebbe combines this approach with four substantive 
legal principles that he argues to be critical to managing tensions 
between religion and equality guarantees. These principles are 
explicitly normative; they establish “a substantive vision of how 
conflicts between traditional believers and egalitarians ought to 
be resolved.”18 These principles are: avoiding harm to others; 
concern for fairness to others; refinement of ideas of freedom of 
association; and the implementation a policy of non-endorsement 
of religion by government.19  
These commitments – both methodological and substantive – 
set forth a bold statement in an area in which tensions run high 
and muddled thinking is endemic.  Although (necessarily) 
imperfect, they promise to advance what has otherwise been a 
 
13 Id. 
14 See generally id.  
15 See TEBBE, supra note 2, at 5. 
16 Id. at 26. 
17 Id. at 8. 
18 Id. at 10. 
19 See id. at 14. 
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largely self-referential and unfocused debate.  Tebbe’s 
methodological prescription and his first two substantive 
principles, in particular, challenge deep and unspoken 
assumptions that have entered this area of law; and they promise 
to fundamentally alter the way that these conflicts are 
approached.20 It is therefore upon those innovations that I will 
focus in these remarks. 
II.  FOUNDATIONAL ISSUES: PARTICULAR PROBLEMS INHERENT IN 
RELIGIOUS CLAIMS 
Conflicts among fundamental values are nothing new in 
American law.  Indeed, conflicts among constitutional guarantees 
representing the most fundamental societal values, and the 
rights that they generate is nothing new.21  Conflicts can arise 
between free speech and a fair trial; between the guarantee of 
personal liberty and the right to privacy; between the right to 
equality and the right to property; and in a myriad of other cases.  
Fundamental societal commitments, expressed through law, are 
almost never precisely delineated or immune from conflicts with 
other fundamental societal commitments.  Yet, in judicial 
decision-making, we proceed with confidence that these conflicts 
can be resolved in an intelligent way.  We do not wring our hands 
or proclaim that resolution of such conflicts is “impossible,” or the 
generated principles are “inherently conflicted” or “incoherent.” 
Yet, that is precisely what is claimed by many analysts of 
religion/government conflicts.22 Thus the question is posed: why 
are conflicts involving religious claims regarded with such 
singular pessimism – indeed, nihilism – in American law? 
The roots of the problem are deep and, seemingly, legally 
intractable.  To begin, there is the courts’ acknowledged 
incompetence in determining what a protected religious claim is.  
In a society in which asserted religious claims are limited in kind 
 
20 See TEBBE, supra note 2, at 14. 
21 KATHLEEN A. BRADY, THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN LAW 10 (2015). 
22 See, generally BRADY; Stanley Fish, Where’s the Beef?, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1037, 1043 
(2014); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Religious Freedom Irrational?, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1043, 
1043 (2014); STEVEN D. SMITH, GETTING OVER EQUALITY: A CRITICAL DIAGNOSIS OF 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA 45 (2001).  As Tebbe states, skeptics often express the 
view that judicial decisions about religious claims will “necessarily . . . devolve into 
conclusory thinking, irrationality, or ipse dixitism.” See TEBBE, supra note 2, at 7.  
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and relatively noncontroversial in content, judicial evaluation of 
what protected “religion” is might not engender much 
controversy.  However, in a religiously diverse society such as the 
United States, which is full of free thinkers, identifying protected 
religious claims can be a difficult task.  The Supreme Court has 
long struggled with this issue, with no resolution to date.  
Definitions of religion in traditional, theistic terms by the Court23 
have yielded to broad inclusions of non-theistic religions such as 
Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, and Secular Humanism.24 
In its latest formulations, the Court has vaguely asserted that 
religious beliefs are those that are “sincere and meaningful,” and 
“occupy a place in the life of those who hold them that is parallel 
to that filled by the orthodox belief in God.”25 There is, of course, 
an obvious problem here – couldn’t just about any strong belief 
qualify under this test?26  Faced with this objection, the Court 
has insisted that religious beliefs are more than mere 
philosophical convictions.27 However, just how they are different 
has never been satisfactorily explained.28 
Concurrently with of this difficulty, the Court has adhered to 
the principle that courts are not competent to examine the 
existence, legitimacy, or sincerity of declared religious beliefs.  
Famously, the Court pronounced in United States v. Ballard29 
that “[m]en may believe what they cannot prove . . .  Religious 
expressions which are as real as life to some may be 
incomprehensible to others.  Yet the fact that they may be 
beyond the ken of mortals does not mean that they can be made 
suspect before the law.”30 In practice, this has meant that the 
Court has simply accepted the legitimacy of asserted religious 
 
 23 See, e.g., United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-634 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., 
dissenting) (religion as “a belief in God involving duties superior to those arising from any 
human relation”); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) (religion as “one’s views of his 
relations to his Creator, and . . . the obligations they impose”). 
24 See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961). 
25 See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965). 
26 Seeger, 380 U.S. 176.  
27 Id.  
28 Id.  
29 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86–87 (1944). 
30 Ballard, 322 U.S. 86-87. 
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claims, even when they were far from anything resembling 
mainstream beliefs.31 
The legal problems that this situation has created are two-fold.  
First, it has meant that individually claimed and legally 
cognizable religious beliefs can be virtually anything, including – 
in our present context – claims that are flatly contradictory to 
existing government norms.32 In addition, and more importantly 
as a matter of legal culture, the idea that courts are 
fundamentally incompetent to evaluate the bona fide nature of 
religious claims has reinforced the idea that religious claims – by 
nature – are unique, transcendently powerful, and something 
apart from government critique, regulation, or control. 
Indeed, the last conclusion is reinforced by the intrinsic nature 
of religious claims themselves.  A signature characteristic of most 
religious claims is the assertion that they are grounded in 
absolute belief, embody absolute truth, and command absolute 
authority.  It is therefore intrinsic to religious beliefs that they 
are not open to question or reconsideration, either by religious 
believers (in most cases) or when confronted by secular law.  
Resolving conflicts between a free press and a fair trial might 
involve re-evaluation and revision of the fundamental beliefs 
involved in both sides of the equation; but resolving conflicts 
between individuals’ true religious beliefs and secular law does 
not.  In other words, because of its nature, the religious belief is 
assumed – by the believer and by others – to be immune from 
forced reevaluation or critique as a part of a conflict-adjudication 
process.  It cannot be subjected to fundamental question, either 
as a matter of truth (for the believer) or as a matter of policy 
 
31 See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 475 (2009); Cutter v. 
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 712 (2005) (asserted religious claims by believers in the Church 
of Jesus Christ Christian, a white supremacist organization; the followers of Asatru, a 
polytheistic religion with claimed Northern European origins; a Satanist; and a witch). 
32 This problem was at the root of the holding in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872, 882–83 (1990), in which the Supreme Court attempted to eliminate the idea 
that religious believers are exempt – as a federal constitutional matter – from otherwise 
neutral and generally applicable secular law.  See id. at 878.  As Justice Scalia (the 
author of the majority opinion) observed, government cannot afford to create a situation 
in which “each conscience is a law unto itself.”  Id. at 890.  This holding does not, of 
course, solve the dilemma of clashing religious claims and equality laws addressed by 
Tebbe’s book; those claims are asserted under newer federal and state statutory 
protections for religion, not federal constitutional law.  See, e.g., Religous Freedom 
Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et. seq.; Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act,  42 U.S.C. §2000cc (et. seq.).   
UNDERKUFFLER (2).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/23/2018  10:44 AM 
2018 REJECTING DOCTRINAL NIHILISM IN RELIGIOUS CLAIMS 223 
analysis by courts.  Under this model, in cases of conflict the 
religious claim is posited to be true, and that truth – and its 
effects – must be accommodated by others.  To put it simply, the 
prevailing model presumes (as incontestable) that a religious 
belief is good, true, powerful, and unchanging in the life of the 
believer; and that, by clear implication, those characteristics 
must be accepted – vis-a-vis others – in its consideration by 
courts. 
III. THE BOOK’S CHALLENGE 
Against this difficult backdrop, we have the arguments of 
Tebbe’s book.  As stated above, he rejects the implications of the 
doctrinal difficulties just described and the conclusions of 
academic skeptics, and argues that conflicts between religious 
beliefs and government equal-rights norms can, in fact, be 
evaluated in a meaningful and principled way.   
A.  The “Social Coherence” Approach 
Let us take, first, Tebbe’s methodological prescription.  Using 
what he calls a “social coherence” approach to religion/equality 
conflicts, Tebbe describes “a way of working through these 
problems that is capable of generating reasoned conclusions.”33 
The key, he argues, is that these conflicts should be approached 
in “the way that people reason through moral problems in 
everyday life.”34 When people confront a new issue, “they 
compare it to familiar situations and to conclusions they have 
[previously] drawn about them after careful consideration.”35  
There is then an effort to “try to find a resolution [to the current 
problem] that fits together their existing judgments . . .  Working 
back and forth, they [work to] test out solutions,” looking for 
harmony with commitments and conclusions that they have 
previously drawn.36 
Important to this process is that “[n]othing is foundational, in 
principle; even long-standing convictions can be revised in light 
 
33 TEBBE supra note 2, at 8. 
34 Id.  
35 Id.  
36 Id. 
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of new evidence or new thinking.”37  When a conclusion is 
reached, it is one that “resonates with their other judgments,” 
and is “backed by reasons” acceptable to them.38 The ultimate 
conclusion, thus, is not reflexive or ad hoc; it is derived through a 
process of comparison, evaluation, and reasoned deliberation. 
The skeptic could undoubtedly attack Tebbe’s approach on the 
basis that it is naive, and contrary to the fundamental nature the 
of claims that it adjudicates.  Most glaringly, the starting point 
that “[n]othing is foundational, in principle”39 might be 
acceptable to the proponent of the government norm, but would 
hardly be acceptable to the religious adherent.  The essence of 
religious belief – as discussed above – is that it is absolute, 
foundational, and transcendent in its command.  How could a 
religious believer be expected to suddenly abandon this 
conviction?  How can religious belief be expected to be open to 
“new evidence,” or “new thinking”? 
Take, for instance, the religious belief that marriage must be 
between a man and a woman – something that is commonly 
asserted against marriage-equality laws.  This belief is not likely 
to be abandoned as “non-foundational” or “ill-advised” because a 
particular method of dispute resolution is suggested.  The social 
coherence approach might be something that is routinely used in 
ordinary common-law adjudication (as Tebbe claims),40 but that 
is just the point – it demands assumptions and flexibility that are 
by their very nature untenable to the religious believers who are 
involved in religion/equality conflicts.  Indeed, one could say, this 
methodological “solution” to the nonjusticiability of religious 
claims deals with the problem of the nature of the religious claim 
by ignoring it. 
This objection has an immediate and compelling surface 
appeal.  Indeed, it can be seen as simply a statement of the 
inevitable consequences of the idea of nature of religious beliefs 
and their required treatment in cases of secular-law conflict, as 
described in the Supreme Court jurisprudence above.  If religious 
 
37 Id. at 9. 
38 TEBBE supra note 2, at 9. 
39 Id. at 9.  
40 See id. (“Lawyers and judges argue over the correct interpretation and application 
of legal doctrines by reference to established precedents and principles, using a more 
formal and institutionalized version of the coherence method.”). 
UNDERKUFFLER (2).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/23/2018  10:44 AM 
2018 REJECTING DOCTRINAL NIHILISM IN RELIGIOUS CLAIMS 225 
beliefs must be accepted as absolutely true, transcendent, and 
unassailable in the life of the believer, then this character must 
be accommodated when conflicts between those beliefs and 
secular norms are adjudicated by courts.  The idea that “long-
standing [religious] convictions can be revised,” or questioned, or 
harmonized with other judgments41 is not something that can be 
asked of the religious believer, and therefore is not something 
that can be engaged in by courts.  
However, let us pause at this point, and consider what was just 
written.  Upon reflection, the logical sequence that is found in the 
last sentence is, in fact, illogical.  We might well assume (as the 
courts have done) that religious beliefs are good, true, powerful, 
and unchanging in the lives of religious believers.  But why must 
this be the way that those beliefs are regarded by courts?   
Consider, for instance, the following example.  A religious 
adherent asserts that her absolute, unerring, unchangeable, and 
transcendent religious beliefs prohibit her signing – as clerk of 
the local town – the marriage licenses of same-sex couples.  That 
situation and its consequences might, indeed, be real to her.  The 
truth of that belief, for her, cannot be questioned by the court.  
But does that make the conflict legally or constitutionally 
“nonjusticiable”?  The assertion by the religious adherent – when 
considered in an adjudicative context – is, in truth, no different 
from the assertion by a parent that he must have sole custody of 
a child, or by an accident victim that he must receive 
compensation from an accident, or that some other result must be 
forthcoming.  The claims of individuals about the consequences of 
decisions are routinely taken into account by courts in the 
making of their independent and detached judgments.  However, 
the fact that individuals assert personal catastrophic 
consequences does not mean that the adjudication of the conflict 
by the court – using its normal processes – is paralyzed, or 
impossible. 
To put it another way, the claim of skeptics and others that 
religious claims are “nonjusticiable” – that is, that they are 
placed by their nature beyond the usual processes and principled 
cognizance of courts – depends upon what I would call the 
“transference fallacy” in religion/government conflicts.  This 
 
41 Id. 
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fallacy assumes the transference of the religious adherent’s 
characterization of the nature of her claim into the court’s 
understanding, and workings, of its own processes.  In fact, this 
transference is neither logically justified nor institutionally 
commanded.  The acceptance of the idea that a claim has 
assertedly dire and unquestioned consequences for an individual 
does not mean that the usual methods for resolving conflicting 
legal claims cannot be utilized by courts.  
By suggesting that religion/equality conflicts should be 
subjected to ordinary, evaluative judicial processes, Tebbe 
brilliantly illuminates the existence of the transference fallacy in 
this context.  The methodological suggestion that Tebbe makes – 
that courts rationally compare, re-evaluate, and consider 
conflicting claims – is something that is accepted in all other 
adjudicative contexts.  The fact that this modest methodological 
suggestion seems so radical in this context is a testament, itself, 
as to how deeply ingrained the transference fallacy in the 
adjudication of religion cases has become.   
The primary objective of Tebbe’s book is to identify a technique 
that decisionmakers can use to resolve conflicts as a matter of 
constitutional or other law.  Although he suggests that the 
antagonists themselves might find the method he suggests to be 
enlightening,42 convincing them to abandon preconceived notions 
and to come to an amicable compromise is not the primary focus 
of the book.  The question, rather, is how our legal institutions 
can approach and resolve religion/equality conflicts in a 
principled way.  When a religion/equality conflict is before a 
court, a decision to protect the religious claim must be “backed by 
reasons” and “resonate[] with other judgments.”43 It must be the 
product of the evaluation of all evidence, and the weighing of all 
societal commitments.  Tebbe’s methodology rejects the idea that 
courts should handle religious claims in the way that religious 
adherents see them, and affirms – instead – the usual workings 
of the courts.   
 
42 Id. at 11 (one purpose of the book is to “encourage antagonists to have conversation 
itself, and to do so by offering explanation, without relying on raw power contests . . .”). 
43 TEBBE, supra note 2, at 9. Tebbe explains that through reaching a conclusion 
backed by reasons, it may be claimed that the “conclusion is demanded or determined by 
those reasons.” 
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B.  The Adoption of Substantive Principles  
Once the use of the courts’ usual adjudicative process is in 
place, the next question is immediately posed.  In any area of 
legal adjudication, there are certain substantive principles that 
are articulated and applied by courts.  For instance, there are 
articulated principles that govern the courts’ evaluations of 
conflicts between free-speech claims and libel laws, freedom of 
the press and fair trial guarantees, liberty claims and criminal 
laws, and all other claims asserted as a matter of constitutional 
or other law.  In all of these contexts, there are substantive 
principles that are derived from deeper societal commitments, 
and that are considered, re-considered, and applied to resolve the 
problems before the courts.  
When we consider the mass of detailed legal evaluations that 
appear in those contexts, we are suddenly aware of a general 
peculiarity when religion/law conflicts are considered by courts.  
When religion conflicts with secular law, it seems to be generally 
assumed that religion – because of its unknowable and 
unquestioned character – is something that is, itself, immune 
from judicial critique.  No matter how serious the conflict 
between religious claims and secular norms, courts will tend to 
go to great pains to avoid any disparaging or critical comment on 
the nature of the religious claims.  There is almost never any 
evaluation of whether particular religious claims are “good,” or 
“desirable,” or “morally grounded,” as compared to any external 
metric.  Whether this is because courts believe themselves to be 
institutionally incompetent to make such judgments, or simply 
want to avoid offense to religious believers, is usually unclear.  
Either way, the result is the same.  Normative judgments – the 
ordinary grist in deciding difficult constitutional and other legal 
cases – are often (indeed, structurally) put aside. 
To illustrate this phenomenon, consider a familiar “doctrinal 
chestnut” in religion/government conflict cases: the Supreme 
Court’s compelling-interest test.44 Although eventually 
 
44 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699-700 (1989) (holding the 
governmental interest in uniformly applying taxes was a compelling interest, and thus 
justified even if there were a substantial burden); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana 
Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-19 (1981) (holding the State’s interests did not 
justify the burden placed on free exercise of religion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 
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abandoned by the Court in federal constitutional cases,45 it 
remains the test in cases brought under federal and state 
statutory free-exercise guarantees. 46 Under the classic 
formulation of this test, claims to act in accordance with religious 
beliefs are protected if they are required by central religious 
tenets; they are substantially burdened by government action; 
and they are not outweighed by compelling interests asserted by 
government.47  
This test appears to be complex and multi-part; but because 
religious claimants are effectively free to define the content of 
their religious beliefs, and thus the profundity of their conflicts 
with secular norms,48 the first two prongs of this test were rarely 
of any practical importance in Supreme Court jurisprudence.49 
Very rarely did the Court question whether a claimed religious 
exercise was required by a central religious belief, or 
 
220-21 (1992) (holding that despite compulsory education serving a compelling state 
interest, the requirement substantially burdened Amish parents’ right to free exercise). 
45 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. 
46 See 42 U.S.C. §2000bb (“The purposes of this Act are – to restore the compelling 
interest test. . . and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion 
is substantially burdened; and to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious 
exercise is substantially burdened by government.”) (emphasis added); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§2000cc  (“No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner 
that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person. . .  unless the 
government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person . . . is in 
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest.”). 
47 See Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699 ((“The free exercise inquiry asks whether 
government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious 
belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the 
burden.”); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718 (“The mere fact that the petitioner’s religious practice 
is burdened by a governmental program does not mean that an exemption accommodating 
his practice must be granted. The state may justify an inroad on religious by showing that 
it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest.”); Yoder, 406 
U.S. at 214 (“In order for [the state action to be upheld] against a claim that [such action] 
interferes with the practice of a legitimate religious belief, it must appear either that the 
States does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that there 
is a state interests of sufficient magnitude to override the interests claiming protection 
under the Free Exercise Clause.”). 
48 See Smith, 494 U.S. at (“Respondents urge us to hold, quite simply, that when 
otherwise prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, not only the 
convictions, but the conduct itself must be free from governmental regulation.”). 
49 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. 
at 716) (“Although the Government does not challenge the sincerity of [the appellee’s 
religious] belief, the Government does contend that payment of Social Security taxes will 
not threaten the integrity of the [appellee’s] . . . religious beliefs or observances.  It is not 
within ‘the judicial function and judicial competence,’ however, to determine whether 
appellee or Government has the proper interpretation of the [appellee’s] . . . faith . . .”). 
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substantially burdened by the complained-of government 
action.50  
After these preliminary issues were put aside, what little was 
left is startling.  Under the compelling-interest test, if a course of 
action is religiously required, and if it is substantially burdened 
by secular law, the only question remaining is whether the 
government interest is “compelling enough” as an abstract notion 
to outweigh the asserted religious claim.  The inquiry does not 
involve, in any way, whether we, as a society, approve or 
disapprove of what the religious claim asserts.  Rather, we 
approach the claim with a norm-neutral eye, and simply ask if 
the government interest so compelling that it should be upheld – 
as an abstract matter – against the opposing (and 
unimpeachable) religious claim. 
This is, again, a departure from the way that other disputes 
are handled.  If a party asserts a free-speech claim, or a child-
rearing claim, or a personal privacy claim, or a national security 
claim, it is routine judicial practice to evaluate that claim – its 
social desirability, its internal rationality, its effects on others – 
in distinctly normative terms.  We do not shirk from evaluating, 
and condemning, claims that parties to litigation assert.  
However, religious claims are different.  They enjoy a kind of 
unspoken “normative immunity” – an immunity from evaluation 
in terms of the norms of the community of which they are a part.  
It is only in the most extreme cases – when the asserted public 
 
50 See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 304–05 
(1985). In this case, the Court denied a free-exercise claim on the ground that government 
action did not actually burden the claimant’s religious beliefs.  Under more recent federal 
and state statutes, lower courts in particular have used the “substantial burden” piece to 
deny religious claims.  This has involved a circuitous argument that religious beliefs, as 
articulated by the religious claimant, did not – in fact – conflict with government 
demands.  See also, Patel v. Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.3d 807 (2008); Corp. of Presiding 
Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. City of West Linn, 86 P.3d 1140, 
1153 (Ore. App. 2004), aff’d, 111 P.3d 1123 (Ore. 2005); Vineyard of Christian Fellowship 
v. City of Evanston, 250 F.Supp. 2d 961, 991–92 (2003). These holdings ignore the truism 
that the religious claimant obviously believes that her beliefs are burdened, since that 
assertion is the basis of the lawsuit.  The idea that the court knows the claimant’s 
religious beliefs and their impingement better than she does is not convincing.  It is 
perhaps for this reason that the “substantial burden” requirement has been eliminated 
from some more recent religious-freedom statutes.  See,, e.g., Ala. Const. Art. I §3.01 
(government “shall not burden” religious exercise); V.A.M.S. §1.302, N.M.S.A. 1978, §28-
22-3, and Gen. Laws 1956, §42–80.1–3 (government “shall not restrict” religious exercise). 
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interest can prevail, in the abstract, against all comers – that the 
test decrees that the religious claim will fail.51 
Against this doctrinal backdrop, and its textual importation 
into current statutes, Tebbe advances a notion of reform.  
Through his suggested substantive principles to be applied in 
religion/equality conflicts, he advances what might be seen as 
mainstream suggestions in any other context but represent a 
radical turn in this.  When conflicts between religious claims and 
equality norms arise, he argues, adjudication must involve 
normative scrutiny of religious claims.52 Under the first 
evaluative principle, courts must evaluate religious claims in 
terms of their harm to others.53 If a religious claim harms third 
parties, that alone can be a reason to deny the religious claim.54  
In addition, courts must evaluate religious claims in terms of 
their fairness to others.55 Accommodation of a religious claim 
cannot be done “if that would be meaningfully unfair to other 
citizens” – for instance, if granting the religious believer 
exemption from secular law should afford her similar benefits or 
freedoms not afforded to citizens of other faiths.56 
There are, of course, objections that could be made to these 
principles on various grounds.  For instance, the meaning of 
sufficient “harm” to others is potentially subject to many 
different interpretations, and concern for “fairness” to others 
conceivably could be used to eliminate the notion of 
accommodation guarantees.  However, the importance of these 
principles – in my view – is not whether they are perfectly (as a 
normative or doctrinal matter) correct or incorrect, or whether 
their implementation (as a practical matter) is trouble-free. 
Rather, their importance lies in the bold assumption that 
religious claims should be subject to normative critique at all.  If 
 
51 It was this concern that was, in substance, behind the Supreme Court’s 
abandonment of the compelling interest test.  As the Smith opinion stated, “[i]t is not 
within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a 
faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.”  As a result, 
all that is left is whether a “presumptively invalid” law (as applied to the religious 
objector) “protect[s] an interest of the highest order” – and not “many laws will . . . meet 
[that] test.”  See Smith, 494 U.S. at 887, 888.  
52 See TEBBE, supra note 2, at 10. 
53 Id. at 49–70. 
54  Id. at 66.  
55 Id. at 71–79. 
56 See id. at 16. 
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a religious claim harms identified others, that alone – under 
Tebbe’s principles —can be enough to deny the religious claim.  
We do not have to twist or somehow elevate that problem into an 
abstract notion so that it qualifies as some kind of “compelling-
government-interest” claim.57  Similarly, the effect of granting a 
particular religious exemption – in terms of fairness to others – 
must be determined and acknowledged.  Even if there is no 
“absolutely compelling” interest in a particular case – even if the 
case does not, in public terms, present a “do-or-die situation” – if 
religious privilege creates demonstrable unfairness to others, the 
court – for just that reason – can deny the religious claim.   
Do these principles have practical consequences?  As Tebbe 
explains with myriad examples throughout his book, they most 
certainly do.  Take, for instance, those situations in which a 
religious employer refuses to afford particular health-care 
benefits to his employees, on the ground that providing those 
benefits (as required by law) will violate his religious beliefs.  In 
such cases, it might be difficult to present every statutory 
mandate in favor of every employee as a do-or-die, “compelling” 
government interest; but the unfairness to particular employees 
from such denials of coverage might well require rejection of the 
religious claim.58  
The principle of fairness to others is also of potentially 
dispositive importance.  There are many situations in which a 
religious accommodation “imposes no appreciable harm on 
anyone else,” but nonetheless works unfairness.59 The crux of 
this situation is that the accommodation “lifts burdens [for the 
religious adherent] that other citizens in a similar situation 
would also like to avoid.”60 When unfairness to others would be of 
a sufficient magnitude to allow the exemption would have to be 
decided on a case-by-case basis.  However, obvious examples 
(that Tebbe discusses) are exemptions from the draft, from sales 
taxes, and from public accommodations laws.61 
 
57 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Thomas v. Review 
Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717–19 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 20–21 (1992). 
58 TEBBE, supra note 2, at 49–51, 68–70. 
59 See id. at 71. 
60 Id.  
61 See id. at 73–78. Tebbe identifies those situations in which unfairness is “serious 
enough,” by suggesting only those cases in which “equal citizenship” is implicated should 
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* * * * * 
In conclusion, Tebbe’s methodological approach and 
prescriptive principles have the potential to cut, incisively, into 
the muddled thinking and paralysis that surround consideration 
of religion/equality conflicts.  They acknowledge, in no uncertain 
terms, that judicial review of religious claims must be distinct 
from the way that those claims are regarded by those who 
advance them.  Religious adherents can believe that religious 
commands are beyond secular evaluation and critique; secular 
courts cannot.  In addition, in the making of that critique, secular 
courts must affirm the methods of decision-making that are used 
in all cases, and they must apply the substantive principles that 
courts are empowered and required to protect.  It is an “old saw” 
that no individual action – including religiously motivated action 
– is absolutely protected by government, or beyond the power of 
the courts.  Standing back, it is surprising, perhaps, that we need 
to hear this important message; but it is just as certain that we 
do.  
 
 
 
come within the principle’s prohibition. See also id. at 76.  How effective this idea might 
be in limiting the fairness principle is open to debate.  However, there is no doubt but that 
the principle of fairness to others captures a deeply resonating and intuitive conviction; 
and that it will preclude the granting of religious claims that would have been granted 
under traditional tests. 
